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Abstract 
Putnam’s (2007) constrict claim states that ethnic diversity has serious consequences 
for social cohesion, making people distrustful and leery. The present contribution extends this 
claim by including political cynicism and trust as side effects of diversity. Moreover, we 
nuance this claim by considering citizens’ social-ideological attitudes as moderators of 
diversity effects. Using a Dutch nationally stratified sample (N = 628), we showed that both 
objective and perceived diversity were associated with more political cynicism and less trust, 
but only for those high in right-wing attitudes (i.e., social dominance orientation and 
particularly authoritarianism). Furthermore, only political cynicism was a unique predictor of 
greater populist party support. Implications for the ongoing debates on the rise in diversity 
and populist parties are discussed. 
Key words: ethnic diversity; social-ideological attitudes; political cynicism; political 
trust; populist party support 
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Based on data from over 30,000 people in 41 different U.S. communities, the 
renowned political scientist Robert Putnam concluded that - other things being equal - more 
ethnic diversity is associated with less trust between and within ethnic groups (Putnam, 2007). 
In addition to the devastating consequences for social cohesion within communities, Putnam 
also suggested that higher diversity has repercussions on people’s ideas about and 
engagement in politics. In particular, Putnam found that greater diversity was related to less 
confidence in local government and leaders, less belief in own political efficacy, and lower 
expectancies of politics. Following Putnam’s infamous claims, numerous studies tested the 
‘hunkering down’ hypothesis with regards to general and intergroup trust (see Hewstone, 
2015; Schaeffer, 2014; van der Meer & Tolsma, 2014). However, relatively little attention has 
been given to the proposed political consequences of diversity (for a notable exception, see 
McLaren, 2017). This is remarkable, especially because citizens’ disillusionment in politics 
and politicians may lie at the basis of increased support for populist parties; an issue that has 
become increasingly important in many Western countries (e.g., Koopmans & Muis, 2009; 
Rydgren, 2008).  
Political trust and cynicism 
Considering the political repercussions, an important question is whether diversity 
within communities merely erodes political trust and engagement among citizens, or whether 
diversity also instills a more ‘angry’ expression of political disillusionment in the form of 
political cynicism, leading people to reject traditional politics and political parties. As such, 
our first hypothesis pertains to the negative relation between diversity on the one hand, and 
lower political trust and greater political cynicism on the other.  
Fifty-odd years ago, the concept of political cynicism was introduced as “the extent to 
which people hold politicians and politics in disrepute” (Agger, Goldstein, & Pearl, 1961, p. 
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477). Pattyn, Van Hiel, Dhont, and Onraet (2012) showed that political cynics’ suspicion 
towards politic(ian)s can be empirically distinguished from mere lack of political trust. 
Indeed, although political cynicism and trust share communalities, as evinced by their high 
negative correlation, cynicism has unique elements as well. Political cynicism is an 
antagonistic form of contempt, with anger and hostility as two of its core elements, whereas 
political trust merely captures content and faith in the (performance of the) current regime 
(Eisinger, 2000). Hence, individuals high in political cynicism generally have negative 
feelings towards and negative expectancies about the intentions and actions of politicians, 
whereas citizens low in political trust merely do not ascribe positive attributes to politicians, 
without necessarily being explicitly negative. Exactly because of the powerful negative 
emotions embedded in political cynicism, it may be more consequential in shaping political 
support and behavior, compared to the more ‘neutral’ lack of trust and disengagement 
described by Putnam (2007).  
Political cynicism, rather than mere lack of trust in traditional political leaders, may 
push people to populist parties rejecting the political establishment and emphasizing the 
contrasts between the “common people” and the “privileged elites” (see Bergh, 2004). These 
populist ‘protest’ parties can be located at the far-right as well as the far-left end of the 
political continuum, though the majority of populist movements are clearly right-wing in most 
Western countries (McClosky & Chong, 1985). Our second hypothesis predicts a substantial 
relative contribution of political cynicism above and beyond mere lack of trust in the 
prediction of support for (right)-populist parties. 
Individual differences shape diversity effects 
Although Putnam (2007) proposed that diversity has negative overall effects within 
communities, many subsequent studies found rather inconsistent evidence (Hewstone, 2015). 
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As a result, various researchers suggested that diversity effects are not generalizable, but 
rather depend on individual difference variables because not everyone reacts in similar ways 
to diversity (e.g., Stolle, Soroka, & Johnston, 2008). Specifically, diversity should trigger 
negative reactions especially (or even exclusively) in people who feel most threatened by 
diversity, based on their social-ideological beliefs and underlying motivations (e.g., Asbrock 
& Kauff, 2015; Van Assche, Roets, Dhont, & Van Hiel, 2014, 2016).  
According to Duckitt’s (2001) Dual-Process Model, social-ideological attitudes fall 
apart into two broad and relatively independent dimensions. The first dimension, often 
operationalized as Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1981), encompasses a set 
of conservative sociopolitical and cultural attitudes including a strict adherence to 
conventional norms and values (i.e., conventionalism), an uncritical subjection to authority 
(i.e., authoritarian submission), and feelings of aggression towards norm violators (i.e., 
authoritarian aggression). The second dimension taps into the economic-hierarchical domain 
and is often operationalized as Social Dominance Orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, 
Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), which reflects acceptance of inequality and the belief that social 
groups should be hierarchically organized. 
Recent studies corroborated that RWA moderates (i.e., strengthens) the relationship 
between diversity and negative intergroup attitudes (e.g., Kauff, Asbrock, Thorner, & 
Wagner, 2013; Van Assche et al., 2016), and similar interaction patterns were found for 
individual differences in dangerous worldviews (Sibley et al., 2013) and conformity values 
(Fasel, Green, & Sarrasin, 2013), two concepts closely related to authoritarianism (Duckitt, 
2001). For SDO, no such studies are currently available and, therefore, the role of SDO in 
shaping diversity effects is yet unknown. However, especially when it comes to diversity and 
(political) trust, we expect that RWA should play a more central role compared to SDO, given 
that maintaining social cohesion and security is an underlying motivation for RWA, but not 
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for SDO (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Kessler & Cohrs, 2008). Indeed, conventionalism and 
traditionalism are core aspects of RWA, and people endorsing these beliefs expect political 
leaders to be the guardians of these values (Altemeyer, 1981). Hence, to high RWA 
individuals, increased ethnic diversity may represent politicians’ failure to live up to that task, 
and should trigger political cynicism and a lack of trust. As such, our third hypothesis states 
that the erosion of political trust and the upsurge in political cynicism in diverse communities 
applies especially to people high in RWA and SDO. Finally however, our fourth hypothesis 
states that when RWA and SDO are considered simultaneously, only RWA substantially 
moderates the association of diversity with political trust and cynicism, with particularly 
cynicism further relating to populist party support. 
The present study 
Extending Putnam’s (2007) claim that higher ethnic diversity makes people less 
trusting of political leaders and disengaged from politics, Hypothesis 1 states that diversity 
also relates to a more vigorous expression of political disillusion in the form of political 
cynicism. Moreover, we expect that cynicism, due to its “arousing” nature is a more potent 
basis of support for extremist-populist parties compared to the rather “neutral” state of lack of 
trust (Hypothesis 2). Based on recent research demonstrating the role of social-political 
attitudes as moderators of diversity effects, Hypothesis 3 states that especially among 
individuals high in RWA (and potentially SDO), diversity will be related to more political 
cynicism, less trust, and more populist party support.  
Finally, we test a moderated mediation model in which social-ideological attitudes 
simultaneously moderate the association of diversity with political attitudes, which further 
relate to populist party support (expecting a more prominent role for RWA as a moderator and 
cynicism as a mediator; Hypothesis 4). To investigate these issues, Koopmans and Schaeffer 
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(2016) highlighted the importance of taking into account objective as well as subjective 
diversity. Indeed, where some studies (e.g., Semyonov, Raijman, Tov, & Schmidt, 2004) 
indicated that especially perceptions of diversity have detrimental effects, other studies (e.g., 
Van Assche et al., 2014; 2016) showed that objective and perceived diversity yield similar 
effects on intergroup attitudes. 
Method 
Participants 
A nationally stratified sample of Dutch citizens (N = 628) without migration 
background from 531 neighborhoods across the Netherlands completed an online survey.
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Respondents first completed a questionnaire about their political attitudes, after which they 
completed a set of items concerning their social-ideological attitudes. All participants 
completed all relevant measures, yielding no missing data. The mean age of the sample was 
54 years (SD = 15.88) and 51% were men (see Appendix A for more information).  
Measures  
Respondents answered the items for perceived diversity, social-ideological attitudes 
and populist party support on seven-point scales ranging from one (none/totally disagree) to 
seven (a lot/totally agree). The items for political attitudes were administered on five-point 
scales anchored by one (totally disagree) and five (totally agree). Table 1 presents the 
descriptive statistics and correlations among all variables.
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Diversity. Data from the Central Bureau for Statistics in the Netherlands provided the 
number of non-Western minority members per neighborhood (i.e., zip code). We calculated 
the percentage as a function of the total number of registered inhabitants per zip code to get an 
objective diversity indicator. Two items tapping into subjectively perceived diversity in one’s 
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direct environment (Semyonov et al., 2004): ‘How many people from immigrant origin live in 
your municipality/city?’ and ‘How many people from immigrant origin live in your street?’. 
Both items were highly positively interrelated (r = .57). 
Social-ideological attitudes. Funke’s (2005) 12-item RWA-scale was administered 
(e.g., ‘Obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should 
learn’; α = .67). SDO was measured with eight items (see Pratto et al., 1994); e.g., ‘Some 
groups of people are simply not the equals of others’; α = .80). 
Political attitudes. The 10-item political cynicism and 10-item political trust scales of 
Pattyn and colleagues (2012) were administered. An example item for cynicism is ‘Most 
politicians are willing to throw their ideals or promises overboard if this increases their 
power’. Cronbach’s alpha was .91. A sample item for trust is ‘One can confidently trust 
politicians’; α = .93. 
Populist party support. In the Netherlands, the ‘Partij Voor de Vrijheid’ (PVV; Party 
for Freedom) is the prime example of a populist, anti-establishment party that has achieved a 
prominent place in the country’s political landscape. PVV can be considered a right-populist 
party, and left-populist parties are rather marginalized in modern-day Dutch politics. 
Respondents completed the item ‘To what extent do you support the program and/or ideas of 
PVV’. 
Results 
Preliminary analyses. We investigated whether multilevel analyses were warranted 
because our data were somewhat nested (individuals were located within zip codes), though 
73% of the respondents in our sample had a unique zip code (N = 457). These analyses 
indicated that objective neighborhood diversity could be considered as an individual-level 
variable in the present study (Appendix A).  
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Simple regression analyses. Next, we investigated whether social-ideological 
attitudes moderated the associations of diversity with our political attitudes (Table 2). We 
conducted twelve regression analyses, testing the effects of either objective or perceived 
diversity on political cynicism, political trust and PVV-support, with RWA or SDO as 
moderator, followed up by simple slope analyses, testing the significance of the regression 
slopes at low (< 1SD below the mean) and high (> 1SD above the mean) levels of the 
moderator. All predictors were centered before running the analyses (Aiken & West, 1991). In 
line with our expectations, all interaction effects for RWA were significant. Objective and 
perceived diversity were only associated with more political cynicism, less trust and more 
PVV-support among people high in RWA, and not among those low in RWA. For SDO, only 
the interaction term with objective diversity on cynicism was significant. Nonetheless, a 
closer look at the simple slopes indicated that, similar to the results for RWA, only among 
those high (versus low) in SDO, objective and perceived diversity tended to be negatively 
related to political trust, and positively related to political cynicism and PVV-support. 
Moderated mediation analyses: RWA and SDO separately. To test the conditional 
indirect effects of diversity on PVV-support via political cynicism and trust, we conducted 
four bootstrap analyses (5,000 bootstrap samples) using Hayes’ Process macro (2013, Model 
7) in which the associations between the predictor (either objective or perceived diversity) and 
both mediators (political cynicism and trust) were moderated by RWA (Figure 1) or SDO 
(Figure 2). The model tests revealed that the indirect associations of diversity with PVV-
support through political cynicism were only significant for those high in RWA, not for low 
authoritarians (Table 3; Figures 1a and 1b). The indirect associations of diversity with PVV-
support through political trust were not significant, neither for high nor for low authoritarians. 
Similarly, the model tests revealed that the indirect associations of diversity with PVV-
support through political cynicism were only significant for those high in SDO (Table 3; 
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Figures 2a and 2b). The indirect associations of diversity with PVV-support through political 
trust were not significant for people both high and low in SDO.  
Moderated mediation analyses: RWA and SDO simultaneously. Interestingly, two 
final models (one for objective and one for perceived diversity) considering both RWA and 
SDO as moderators simultaneously (Hayes, 2013; Model 9) indicated that only RWA was a 
unique moderator for the diversity effects. Finally, as expected, political cynicism (all βs > 
0.25, all ts > 3.45, all ps < .001), but not political trust (all βs < -0.09, all ts < -1.54, all ps > 
.12), further related to more PVV-support in all six moderated mediation models. Hence, 
when included together, only political cynicism turned out to be a unique predictor of right-
populist party support.
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Discussion 
The current research focused on psychological and socio-structural factors that are 
thought to play a fundamental role in individuals’ views on politics and politicians. Building 
on previous findings, our primary objective was to delineate the interplay between 
neighborhood ethnic diversity and social-ideological attitudes to predict right-populist party 
support via political cynicism and trust.  
The political correlates of diversity  
Corroborating our expectations, our analyses revealed positive associations between 
diversity and political cynicism and negative associations between diversity and trust 
(Hypothesis 1) which, importantly, were dependent upon individual differences. Indeed, we 
found that, exclusively among those who held right-wing attitudes, diversity was related to 
lower political trust and greater cynicism (Hypothesis 3). Furthermore, political cynicism, but 
not political trust, was in turn uniquely predictive of more right-populist party support 
(Hypothesis 2). Hence, these results indicate that, although diversity does not inevitably relate 
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to support for populist, anti-establishment parties, the combination with pre-existing social-
ideological attitudes seems to produce a potent cocktail for political cynicism and stronger 
support for right-populist parties. These findings add to the growing insight in the differential 
effects of diversity for people low versus high in right-wing social-ideological attitudes, 
which is commonly explained in terms of the latter individuals being most sensitive to the 
perceived cultural threat posed by diversity (e.g., Sibley et al., 2013; Van Assche et al., 2014; 
2016). 
The moderation effects were always significant for authoritarianism and often non-
significant for SDO (Hypothesis 4).
4
 Previous studies already showed differences between 
RWA and SDO in their moderating effects (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010), and our findings align 
with the rationale that ethnic diversity particularly threatens authoritarians’ underlying 
motivation to maintain social order and security, but it is less relevant for social dominators’ 
motivation to maintain social hierarchy (see also Sibley et al., 2013). 
The future of diversity studies 
With the rise of ethnic diversity in Western-European communities, the question of 
whether and how this diversity affects social and political life has become an increasingly 
prominent and contested topic of academic and political debate. Since Putnam’s article 
(2007), over 90 studies have investigated the association between diversity and societal trust 
(Schaeffer, 2014; van der Meer & Tolsma, 2014). However, in addition to pointing out the 
key role of individual differences in this association, the present results also demonstrated that 
cynicism may be a relevant variable to include when studying the political repercussions of 
diversity. Indeed, diversity showed similar relations with political cynicism and trust among 
right-wing individuals, but only political cynicism uniquely explained the relation between 
diversity and right-populist party support in these individuals. In response to (perceived) 
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growing local minority proportions, right-wing individuals might thus act upon their feelings 
of cynicism by casting a populist vote. Future studies investigating the consequences of 
diversity would therefore benefit from including political cynicism in addition to trust, 
especially when focusing on political party support. Such studies could also explore the 
longitudinal and potentially bidirectional associations between populist party support and 
political attitudes over time.  
 An important merit of the present study is the inclusion of both the actual and the 
perceived diversity within the respondents’ direct environment. Indeed, the similar patterns of 
results for objective and perceived diversity refute alternative interpretations in terms of 
biased or extreme responding that may apply to studies only measuring perceived diversity. 
As such, this study offers an empirically substantiated view on the additive and interactive 
influence of contextual differences in ethnic diversity and individual differences in social-
ideological attitudes on relevant contemporary topics such as political cynicism, trust, and 
right-populist party support.  
Nevertheless, it remains relatively unknown how our findings generalize to other 
political contexts, particularly in those countries where left-populist parties gain a substantial 
share of votes (e.g., Greece). In such countries, it would be possible to examine the tentative 
hypothesis that diversity relates to more left-populist support, especially among people 
scoring low on authoritarianism. Indeed, one may expect that whereas a higher minority 
proportion can trigger cynicism and lack of trust in high authoritarians, it may evoke and 
galvanize positive diversity beliefs in low authoritarians. These beliefs, in turn, may lead them 
to support left-populist parties if these parties advocate a strong multicultural rhetoric that 
they no longer find in traditional (left) parties. 
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Finally, a potential limitation in the current study resides in the framing of the items. 
Indeed, all political trust items are positively framed, whereas all cynicism items are 
negatively coded. This might have affected our findings about the relative importance of 
political cynicism (compared to political trust) in the prediction of populist party support. 
Further research with newly-developed scales that are more balanced in this regard, could 
account for this potential limitation. 
Conclusion 
The present study brings together the hitherto dissociated research lines into one 
political-psychological model. Our results indicate that, via increased feelings of political 
cynicism, higher levels of ethnic diversity may push citizens with right-wing social-
ideological attitudes to support populist and anti-establishment political agendas.   
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Notes 
[1]
 Power analyses, conducted with the ‘pwr’ package (Champely, Ekstrom, Dalgaard, 
Gill, & De Rosario, 2015) in R (version 3.3.1; R Core Team, 2015), indicated that with our 
sample size, we had a power of approximately 97% to detect a small-to-medium sized 
interaction effect (β = .15; two-sided test; Gignac & Szodorai, 2016). The dataset was 
collected through an independent ISO 26362-certified survey company as a part of a larger 
multi-wave panel study (OSF: https://osf.io/hbs8w). We analyzed data from the second wave, 
which specifically tapped into political attitudes. From every zip code region, at least five 
respondents were recruited, providing us with a heterogeneous sample of adults from all 
regions in the Netherlands. A zip code region in the Netherlands is comprised of all zip codes 
that share the first two digits (for example: zip code region one consists of all zip codes 
between 1000 and 1099, zip code region two consists of all zip codes between 1100 and 1199, 
…, zip-code region 90 consists of all zip codes between 9900 and 9999). A zip code region 
covers about 82 square kilometers.  
 [2]
 In order to check the distinctiveness of political cynicism and political trust, we 
conducted a principal component analysis with direct oblimin rotation including the items of 
both scales. The pattern matrix clearly showed two factors, with each item loading primarily 
on its specific factor (Appendix B; see also Pattyn et al., 2012). Moreover, further analyses 
indicated that there were no multicollinearity issues (all VIFs < 2.84). 
[3]
 Running the analyses with age, gender, education, and income level as control 
variables yielded similar results. Additionally, a comparative test (Preacher & Hayes, 2008) 
indicated that the indirect effect via political cynicism was slightly stronger than the indirect 
effect via political trust. Particularly, the difference scores (Δb = 0.037; boot S.E. = 0.027; 
CI95 = [0.004; 0.084] for objective diversity; and Δb = 0.024; boot S.E. = 0.017; CI95 = [0.008; 
0.040] for perceived diversity), specified that political cynicism had a slightly larger unique 
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ability to account for the associations of diversity with populist party support. Finally, a test of 
a model investigating the conditional effects of objective diversity on perceived diversity 
revealed that the strong and positive associations between objective and perceived diversity 
were especially pronounced among individuals with high RWA and SDO levels. Detailed 
results of these additional analyses are available in Appendix C. 
[4]
 Notably, although the interaction effects with RWA were significant and those with 
SDO were not, the interaction effects themselves were not significantly different from each 
other. 
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Tables and figures 
Table 1. Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations among Variables. 
Measure M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Objective Diversity 11.02 11.41 -      
2. Perceived Diversity 3.38 1.47 .59*** -     
3. Authoritarianism  3.91 0.77 -.06 .02 -    
4. Social Dominance Orientation 3.05 1.06 .01 .07 .32*** -   
5. Political Cynicism 3.35 0.73 .01 .07 .30***  .13** -  
6. Political Trust 2.74 0.68 -.04 -.08* -.18*** -.08* -.75*** - 
7. Populist Party Support 3.07 2.15 .04 .11* .45*** .32*** .32*** -.27*** 
Note: 
*
 p < .05; 
**
 p < .01; 
***
 p < .001. The response scales ranged from 0% to 100% 
for objective diversity, from 1 to 7 for authoritarianism, social dominance orientation, and 
populist party support, and from 1 to 5 for political cynicism and trust. 
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Table 2. Standardized and unstandardized estimates (95% confidence intervals in brackets) of 
regression analyses for Political Cynicism, Political Trust, and Populist Party Support. 
 
Political Cynicism Political Trust Populist Party Support 
 
β b (CI95) β b (CI95) β b (CI95) 
Objective Diversity (OD) .05 
0.30 
(-0.29; 0.88) 
-.07 
-0.44 
(-1.01; 0.12) 
.08 
1.56 
(-0.06; 3.17) 
RWA .22
*** 0.21 
(0.13; 0.30) 
-.16
*** -0.14 
(-0.23; -0.06) 
.44
*** 1.23 
(1.01; 1.45) 
OD X RWA .10
* 0.88 
(0.10; 1.67) 
-.09
* -0.74 
(-1.50; -0.02) 
.13
*** 3.32 
(1.28; 5.36) 
OD effect for low RWA -.06 
-0.38 
(-1.20; 0.44) 
.02 
-0.13 
(-0.67; 0.92) 
-.06 
-1.06 
(-3.40; 1.27) 
OD effect for high RWA .15
* 0.98 
(0.12; 1.83) 
-.17
** -1.01 
(-1.84; -0.18) 
.22
*** 4.18 
(1.95; 6.41) 
Perceived Diversity (PD) .04 
0.02 
(-0.02; 0.07) 
-.10
* -0.04 
(-0.09; 0.00) 
.10
* 0.14 
(0.01; 0.28) 
RWA .18
*** 0.17 
(0.08; 0.26) 
-.13
** 0.12 
(-0.20; -0.03) 
.44
*** 1.22 
(0.96; 1.46) 
PD X RWA .17
*** 0.10 
(0.04; 0.17) 
-.14
** -0.09 
(-0.14; -0.03) 
.12
** 0.23 
(0.06; 0.40) 
PD effect for low RWA -.12 
-0.06 
(-0.13; 0.01) 
.04 
0.02 
(-0.05; 0.08) 
-.02 
-0.03 
(-0.24; 0.17) 
PD effect for high RWA .20
*** 0.10 
(0.04; 0.16) 
-.24
*** -0.11 
(-0.17; -0.05) 
.22
*** 0.32 
(0.15; 0.50) 
Objective Diversity (OD) .02 
0.15 
(-0.41; 0.72) 
-.05 
-0.31 
(-0.85; 0.23) 
.07 
1.25 
(-0.50; 2.99) 
SDO .13
** 0.09
 
(0.03; 0.15) 
-.08
a -0.05
 
(-0.11; 0.00) 
.32
*** 0.64 
(0.47; 0.82) 
OD X SDO .09
* 0.58 
(0.03; 1.12) 
.00 
0.00 
(-0.52; 0.52) 
.06 
1.04 
(-0.57; 2.65) 
OD effect for low SDO -.07 
-0.46 
(-1.23; 0.31) 
-.05 
-0.31 
(-1.04; 0.42) 
.01 
0.13 
(-2.19; 2.45) 
OD effect for high SDO .12
a 0.77
 
(-0.08; 1.62) 
-.05 
-0.31 
(-1.11; 0.50) 
.13
a 2.36
 
(-0.22; 4.94) 
Perceived Diversity (PD) .06 
0.03 
(-0.01; 0.07) 
-.08
a -0.04
 
(-0.08; 0.01) 
.09
* 0.13 
(0.00; 0.26) 
SDO .13
** 0.09 
(0.03; 0.15) 
-.07
a -0.05 
(-0.10; 0.01) 
.31
*** 0.63 
(0.46; 0.81) 
PD X SDO .06 
0.03 
(-0.01; 0.07) 
-.02 
-0.01 
(-0.05; 0.03) 
.07 
0.10 
(-0.02; 0.21) 
PD effect for low SDO -.01 
0.00 
(-0.06; 0.06) 
-.05 
-0.03 
(-0.08; 0.03) 
.02 
0.03 
(-0.15; 0.21) 
PD effect for high SDO .12
* 0.06 
(0.00; 0.12) 
-.10
a -0.04
 
(-0.10; 0.01) 
.16
** 0.23 
(0.06; 0.41) 
Note: 
a
 p < .10; 
*
 p < .05; 
**
 p < .01; 
***
 p < .001 
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Table 3. Standardized and unstandardized estimates (95% confidence intervals in brackets) of 
indirect effects of Objective or Perceived Diversity on Populist Party Support via Political 
Cynicism and Political Trust at high and low levels of Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) 
or Social Dominance Orientation (SDO). 
  
Indirect Effect via 
Political Cynicism 
Indirect Effect via 
Political Trust 
  β b (CI95) β b (CI95) 
Objective Diversity  
For low RWA -.02 
-0.34 
(-1.53; 0.50) 
.00 
-0.02 
(-0.45; 0.15) 
For high RWA .05
* 0.85 
(0.13; 2.02) 
.01
 0.16 
(-0.31; 0.92) 
Objective Diversity 
For low SDO -.02
 -0.34 
 (-1.20; 0.32) 
.00
 -0.02 
(-0.45; 0.15) 
For high SDO .03
* 0.65 
(0.06; 1.69) 
.01 
0.16 
(-0.31; 0.92) 
Perceived Diversity  
For low RWA -.03 
-0.05 
(-0.09; 0.02) 
.00 
0.00 
(-0.04; 0.01) 
For high RWA .06
** 0.08 
(0.03; 0.18) 
.01
 0.01 
(-0.04; 0.09) 
Perceived Diversity  
For low SDO .00
 0.00 
(-0.06; 0.06) 
.00
 0.01 
(-0.01; 0.05) 
For high SDO .03
* 0.05 
(0.01; 0.12) 
.01 
0.02 
(-0.01; 0.07) 
Note: 
a
 p < .10; 
*
 p < .05; 
**
 p < .01; 
***
 p < .001 
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Figure 1. Standardized results of the models testing the associations of Objective Diversity 
(Figure 1a) and Perceived Diversity (Figure 1b), with Populist Party Support via Political 
Cynicism and Trust, at high and low levels of Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA). 
Figure 1a.  
Figure 1b.   
Note: 
a
 p < .10; 
*
 p < .05; 
**
 p < .01; 
***
 p < .001. The total explained variance (R
2
) in 
populist party support was 11.79% (F(3, 462) = 18.63; p < .001) and 10.74% (F(3, 462) = 18.54; p 
< .001) in the model with objective and perceived diversity, respectively.  
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Figure 2. Standardized results of the models testing the associations of Objective Diversity 
(Figure 2a) and Perceived Diversity (Figure 2b), with Populist Party Support via Political 
Cynicism and Trust, at high and low levels of Social Dominance Orientation (SDO). 
Figure 2a.   
Figure 2b.  
Note: 
a
 p < .10; 
*
 p < .05; 
**
 p < .01; 
***
 p < .001. The total explained variance (R
2
) in 
populist party support was 10.29% (F(3, 462) = 17.67; p < .001) and 10.74% (F(3, 462) = 18.54; p 
< .001) in the model with objective and perceived diversity, respectively.  
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Supplementary materials 
Appendix A. Additional Sample Information.  
Demographics. Males were slightly overrepresented (49.00% in our sample was 
female versus 50.49% in the general population). As for age, younger adults were slightly 
underrepresented. In our sample, 8.60% were between 18 and 24 years old (versus 12.07% 
between 15 and 24 in the general population), 45.80% were between 25 and 54 years old 
(versus 39.52% in general), 18.00% were between 55 and 64 years old (versus 13.28% in 
general), and 19.60% were older than 65 (versus 18.73% in general). Further, thirty-five 
percent of the participants had completed primary school, 40% had completed high school 
and 24% had a college or university degree. Annual gross household income showed a fairly 
normal distribution, with 6% earning less than €11,000, 13% between €11,000 and €23,000, 
23% between €23,000 and €34,000, 22% between €34,000 and €56,000, and 12% earned 
more than €56,000. Twenty-four percent of the respondents chose the option “I do not want to 
disclose this information”. Finally, 47% of the participants was Christian, 41% did not have a 
religious denomination, 5% were atheist, 2% were agnostic, and 4% categorized themselves 
as belonging to an ‘other religion’. 
Preliminary Analyses. We estimated empty (intercept-only) models, which provide 
insight in the variances in our outcomes at the individual and contextual level. We also 
assessed the intraclass correlations (ICCs) to explore if there was substantial between-level 
variance, which would warrant the use of multilevel modeling. Taking into account the 
higher-level structure did not improve the goodness-of-fit statistics of each model 
significantly (i.e., changes in -2 * log-likelihood were χ²(1) = 0.00, p > .250 and χ²(1) = 0.00, 
p > .250 for the mediators political cynicism and trust, and χ²(1) = 3.31, p = .079 for the 
outcome PVV-support, respectively). Additionally, the ICC’s were small in size (0.00 for 
political cynicism, 0.01 for trust, and 0.09 for PVV-support). 
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Appendix B. Pattern Matrix Coefficients among Cynicism and Trust Items. 
Item 
Factor 1: 
Cynicism 
Factor 2: 
Trust 
Almost all politicians will sell out their ideals or break their promises 
if it will increase their power 
.79 
 
Politicians pretend to care more about people than they really do .78  
Politicians primarily act out of self-interest .77  
No man can hope to stay honest once he enters politics .76  
Politicians are only interested in getting and maintaining power .75  
Our political leaders are prepared to lie to us whenever it suits their 
purposes 
.70  
If a politician sticks to his ideals and principles, he is unlikely to 
reach the top of his profession 
.68  
All politicians are bad – some are just worse than others .65  
People are very frequently manipulated by politicians .48 
 
Corruption is a serious issue in our political system .39 .30 
It is often possible to trust politicians with a restful heart  .86 
Most politicians are confident without having to be much controlled  .83 
In general, one can rely on politicians to do the right thing  .83 
Most politicians are honest and in no way corrupt  .78 
Politicians put the interests of the people over the interests of their 
own party 
 .77 
Politicians usually have good intentions  .77 
When politicians make statements on television or other media, they 
usually tell the truth 
 .70 
I have good faith in the political system  .67 
Politicians usually try to keep the promises they made during the 
elections 
 .66 
Most politicians care about their constituencies  .65 
Note: Factor coefficients are shown only if > 0.30. Cross-loadings in italics. 
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Appendix C. Additional Analyses Controlling for Background Characteristics. 
Table A. Unstandardized estimates (95% confidence intervals in brackets) of regression 
analyses controlling for age, gender, education, and income level. 
 
Political Cynicism Political Trust Populist Party Support 
 
b (CI95) b (CI95) b (CI95) 
Objective Diversity (OD) 
0.38 
(-0.23; 0.98) 
-0.51
a 
(-1.10; 0.08) 
1.80* 
(0.20; 3.41) 
RWA 
0.13** 
(0.04; 0.22) 
-0.10* 
(-0.19; -0.01) 
1.10*** 
(0.86; 1.33) 
OD X RWA 
0.82* 
(0.01; 1.64) 
-0.61
a 
(-1.41; 0.09) 
2.74** 
(0.71; 4.77) 
OD effect for low RWA 
-0.25 
(-1.10; 0.59) 
-0.05 
(-0.87; 0.78) 
-0.37 
(-2.70; 1.97) 
OD effect for high RWA 
1.01* 
(0.11; 1.90) 
-0.98* 
(-1.85; -0.18) 
3.97*** 
(1.76; 6.17) 
Perceived Diversity (PD) 
0.03 
(-0.01; 0.08) 
-0.06* 
(-0.10; -0.01) 
0.18** 
(0.05; 0.32) 
RWA 
0.12** 
(0.03; 0.21) 
-0.09* 
(-0.17; 0.00) 
0.95*** 
(0.68; 1.23) 
PD X RWA 
0.09** 
(0.03; 0.15) 
-0.08** 
(-0.14; -0.02) 
0.23** 
(0.05; 0.41) 
PD effect for low RWA 
-0.04 
(-0.10; 0.03) 
0.01 
(-0.06; 0.07) 
0.00 
(-0.21; 0.22) 
PD effect for high RWA 
0.10*** 
(0.04; 0.16) 
-0.12*** 
(-0.17; -0.06) 
0.37*** 
(0.19; 0.54) 
Objective Diversity (OD) 
0.17 
(-0.37; 0.72) 
-0.32 
(-0.85; 0.21) 
1.58
a 
(-0.10; 3.27) 
SDO 
0.09**
 
(0.04; 0.15) 
-0.05*
 
(-0.11; 0.00) 
0.58*** 
(0.40; 0.75) 
OD X SDO 
0.46
a 
(-0.06; 0.99) 
-0.07 
(-0.58; 0.44) 
0.74 
(-0.81; 2.30) 
OD effect for low SDO 
-0.32 
(-1.06; 0.42) 
-0.25 
(-1.04; 0.55) 
0.79 
(-1.46; 3.04) 
OD effect for high SDO 
0.66
a 
(-0.15; 1.48) 
-0.40 
(-1.12; 0.32) 
2.38
a 
(-0.11; 4.87) 
Perceived Diversity (PD) 
0.04
a 
(-0.01; 0.08) 
-0.04
a 
(-0.11; 0.01) 
0.15* 
(0.02; 0.28) 
SDO 
0.09** 
(0.03; 0.15) 
-0.05*
 
(-0.08; 0.00) 
0.56*** 
(0.39; 0.73) 
PD X SDO 
0.02 
(-0.02; 0.06) 
0.00 
(-0.04; 0.03) 
0.07 
(-0.04; 0.19) 
PD effect for low SDO 
0.02 
(-0.04; 0.08) 
-0.04 
(-0.10; 0.02) 
0.07 
(-0.11; 0.25) 
PD effect for high SDO 
0.06* 
(0.00; 0.12) 
-0.05
a 
(-0.10; 0.01) 
0.23** 
(0.06; 0.40) 
Note: 
a
 p < .10; 
*
 p < .05; 
**
 p < .01; 
***
 p < .001 
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Table B. Unstandardized estimates (95% confidence intervals in brackets) of indirect effects 
of Objective or Perceived Diversity on Populist Party Support via Political Cynicism and 
Political Trust at high and low levels of Right-Wing Authoritarianism (RWA) or Social 
Dominance Orientation (SDO), controlling for age, gender, education, and income level. 
  
Indirect Effect  
via Political Cynicism 
Indirect Effect  
via Political Trust 
  b (CI95) b (CI95) 
Objective Diversity  
For low RWA 
-0.09 
(-1.02; 0.48) 
0.04 
(-0.35; 0.63) 
For high RWA 
0.58* 
(0.04; 1.70) 
0.19 
(-0.01; 1.59) 
Objective Diversity 
For low SDO 
-0.19 
 (-0.94; 0.32) 
0.08 
(-0.14; 0.74) 
For high SDO 
0.43
a 
(-0.01; 1.30) 
0.11 
(-0.09; 0.75) 
Perceived Diversity  
For low RWA 
-0.01 
(-0.07; 0.02) 
0.00 
(-0.04; 0.02) 
For high RWA 
0.05** 
(0.02; 0.12) 
0.03 
(-0.01; 0.09) 
Perceived Diversity  
For low SDO 
0.01 
(-0.03; 0.06) 
0.01 
(-0.01; 0.06) 
For high SDO 
0.04* 
(0.01; 0.10) 
0.02 
(-0.01; 0.07) 
Note: 
a
 p < .10; 
*
 p < .05; 
**
 p < .01; 
***
 p < .001 
 
Table C. Unstandardized estimates (95% confidence intervals in brackets) of regression 
analyses for Perceived Diversity. 
 RWA  
as moderator 
SDO  
as moderator 
 
 
b (CI95) b (CI95) 
 
Objective Diversity (OD) 
7.73*** 
(6.80; 8.67) 
7.84*** 
(6.90; 8.79) 
 
Social-Ideological Attitude (SIA) 
0.09 
(-0.04; 0.23) 
0.10* 
(0.00; 0.20) 
 
OD X SIA 
1.97** 
(0.01; 1.64) 
0.66 
(-0.25; 1.58) 
 
OD effect for low SIA 
6.21*** 
(4.82; 7.60) 
7.14*** 
(5.85; 8.43) 
 
OD effect for high SIA 
9.26*** 
(7.95; 10.57) 
8.55*** 
(7.13; 9.97) 
 
Note: 
a
 p < .10; 
*
 p < .05; 
**
 p < .01; 
***
 p < .001 
 
